The Bankruptcy Crisis by Warren, Elizabeth
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 73 | Issue 4 Article 1
Fall 1998
The Bankruptcy Crisis
Elizabeth Warren
Harvard Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Warren, Elizabeth (1998) "The Bankruptcy Crisis," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 73: Iss. 4, Article 1.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol73/iss4/1
The Bankruptcy Crisis
ELIZABETH WARREN*
INTRODUCTION
Americans love records, statistics, and amazing numbers. Home runs, rushing
yardage, presidential-approval ratings, smoking-related deaths, and murder
rates-all offer great material for attention-grabbing headlines. In 1996, the
bankruptcy system stepped into the spotlight by supplying an attention-grabbing
number of its own: more than a mnillion bankruptcies were filed in a single year.'
The filing rate had increased sharply over the previous year, but this was nothing
new. Rather, the magic of "one million" made bankruptcy a newsworthy subject
to be covered in virtually every newspaper, news magazine, and national
television news program during the year. Bankruptcy, like baseball and public-
opinion polls, had become a sport of numbers, perhaps not widely understood,
but the subject of breathless reports, as the benchmark of a million-plus
consumer filings was passed.
The million-filing mark might have been a short-lived subject for the popular
press but for one factor: the filing rate gave the credit industry an opportunity to
plead its case publicly that Congress should significantly restructure the
bankruptcy laws. The fact that one million families filed for bankruptcy signified
a crisis, namely that it is too easy to file for bankruptcy. The credit industry also
offered the blueprint for a solution: make it more difficult for families to file for
bankruptcy.
Business bankruptcy filings are not part of the alleged crisis. Perhaps a robust
economy or the increasing sophistication of parties to craft out-of-court workouts
has kept the business bankruptcy system out of the news. Business bankruptcy
cases account for only about four percent of all bankruptcy filings and the
* Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Melissa Jacoby read and
commented on an earlier draft of this paper, providing a number of insights that are reflected
in the final version of this paper. Dr. Teresa Sullivan and Professor Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
my longtime coauthors, not only helped produce much of the data that are central to the
discussion in this paper, they also provided useful comments in the construction of this paper.
I offer heartfelt thanks to all three and add the usual caveat that they are not to be blamed for
my errors.
In addition, Professors Marianne Culhane and Michaela White were extraordinarily generous
in permitting me access to their 1995 data from the Reaffirmation Project. The Honorable
Barbara Sellers collected the raw data from the 1997 Ohio sample, which she offered to the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission. She was kind enough to permit me to analyze the
data and report on them here. The multiyear, multidistrict comparison reported in this paper
would have been impossible without the extraordinarily valuable contributions of people who
have labored hard to bring reliable data into the bankruptcy debates. For Professors Sullivan,
Westbrook, Culhane, and White and Judge Sellers, I am in your debt.
1. See News Release, Calendar Year Shows Bankruptcy Filings up 27 Percent over 1995,
ADMINISTRATIE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Mar. 18, 1997 (on file with author).
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number of business filings has been dropping gradually for nearly a decade.2 A
single business filing can have a powerful impact on workers, suppliers, and a
local economy, but reporting tends to focus on the details of a particular case, not
on an alarming trend. Outside the rarified corridors of academia, few people are
calling publicly for the overhaul of the business bankruptcy system.
The consumer bankruptcy system, however, has been subjected to vigorous and
repeated attack. Pundits implicitly assume that it is fine for the current system to
permit businesses in financial trouble to stiff each other and perhaps even to
dump their employees and wiggle out of their obligations to consumers, but the
fact that Mary Beth and Kevin Rourke discharge their debt to Citibank signifies
that something is terribly wrong in a well-ordered legal system.
The line of argument that casts families as villains-or at least as
suspects-starts and ends with the sharp rise in consumer bankruptcy filings.
Why would a million families file for bankruptcy in a time of unparalleled
prosperity? Why would bankruptcy filings rise by more than twenty percent each
year from 1994 through 1997 when inflation and unemployment were both
falling? The obvious answer, according to the credit industry, is that consumers
must be taking advantage of their creditors and using the bankruptcy system to
shuck legal responsibilities they otherwise could have met easily. The credit
industry has concluded that the system is full of these people engaging in this
abusive activity. We are in a crisis, say the creditors, and a crisis means that the
time has come for reform that will limit the last resort of the bankruptcy
discharge for American families.
The argument for sweeping change is powerful in its simplicity. It rests on a
single premise: an assumed connection between one-million-plus filings and
consumer abuse. If the assumption is erroneous, then the clamor for radical and
costly bankruptcy reform is misplaced. Indeed, a different explanation for the
rise in filing might support a very different view of the financial health of
American families and the function of the bankruptcy system.
I. WHY ARE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCIES INCREASING?
The actual explanation for the rise in consumer bankruptcies is at once both
elegantly simple and devilishly complex. The simple explanation is that
consumer bankruptcies are rising because consumers' debts are rising faster than
their incomes. More debt means more families are in trouble or are vulnerable to
trouble. The complex answer explores why debts are outstripping income for an
increasing number of Americans.
The easiest way to think of the role of rising consumer debt in consumer
failures is to envision American families as hikers. Through life, the hike is
2. See id. Although the Administrative Office gives both business and nonbusiness filings,
the question of what constitutes a "business" is more complex than the clearly divided numbers
would suggest. In our earlier work, for example, we found that in a sample of "nonbusiness"
files in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, that as much as 20% of the sample involved the debts of
failed businesses. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIzABEr WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, AS WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 111 (1989)
[hereinafter As WE FORGIVE].
1080 [Vol. 73:1079
THE BANKRUPTCY CRISIS
sometimes uphill and sometimes downhill, and the path is sometimes strewn with
obstacles. As they hike, the adults may acquire debt, which is much like putting
rocks in their backpacks. If the packs have only a few rocks, the family can
withstand most of the events and calamities they are likely to encounter. But as
the pack grows heavier, smaller and smaller misfortunes will cause the hikers to
fall, unable to continue the hike. The only way they can get back on their feet is
by emptying some of the rocks from their packs. More Americans' packs are
getting heavier with debts, and more of them find that they can continue only if
they unload some of their rocks by declaring bankruptcy.
A. More Debt, More Bankruptcy
The macrodata3 are unambiguous about the best predictor for consumer
bankruptcy. Consumer bankruptcy filings rise and fall with the levels of
consumer debt. After a comprehensive analysis of household indebtedness, the
Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") concluded that "[t]he incidence of
bankruptcy in the adult population closely follows the indebtedness of the
household sector."4 As more families carry more debt, a larger percentage of
them end up in the bankruptcy courts.' The CBO graph reproduced on the
following page illustrates the correlation.
3. Macrodata are aggregated data about large economic trends such as bankruptcy filing
rates, consumer debt, inflation, unemployment, changes in the gross national product, and so
on that correlate certain trends, such as the rise and fall in consumer bankruptcy filings, with
other variables.
4. The Increase in Personal Bankruptcy and the Crisis in Consumer Credit: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 39 (1997) (statement of Kim J. Kowalewski, Chief, Financial and
General Macroeconomic Analysis Unit, Macroeconomic Analysis Division, CBO).
5. See id
10811998]
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FIGURE 1
Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases and Debt
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Dotted areas are recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
The fact that bankruptcies are rising during a time of prosperity is readily
explainable as well. The CBO noted that a rise in consumer bankruptcies "during
periods of economic expansion is not really surprising ' 6 since household debt
also increases during economic expansion.
Other detailed studies of time-series data explore a range of economic factors
in greater detail, but they reach a similar conclusion. Economics professor
Jagdeep Bhandari and business professor Lawrence Weiss reviewed data about
economic conditions and bankruptcy filing rates from 1946 through 1991. They
note the high positive correlation between consumer debt and bankruptcy filings
(both rise together) and the high negative correlation between income and
bankruptcy filings (as one rises the other falls). They concluded, "[o]ur evidence
indicates that the increase in the number of bankruptcy filings is primarily due
to the increased level of debt as a percentage of income."7
Two economists, Professor Ian Domowitz and Professor Elie Tamer, developed
a statistical model to estimate bankruptcy filing rates.' They determine that from
1939 to 1994 bankruptcy legislation favorable to debtors has had little effect on
6. Id.
7. Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, The Increasing Bankruptcy Filing Rate:
An Historical Analysis, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1 (1993).
8. See Ian Domowitz & Elie Tamer, Two Hundred Years of Bankruptcy: A Tale of
Legislation and Economic Fluctuations (May 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Department of Economics at Northwestern University).
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bankruptcy filings.9 These researchers suggest that consumers do not take
advantage of more favorable bankruptcy laws;'0 instead, bankruptcy filings are
driven by economic factors.
Economist Lawrence Ausubel developed a related explanation of rising
bankruptcy filing rates. While he documents the relationship between high
consumer debt generally and rising consumer bankruptcies, he focuses more
specifically on the tie between credit card default rates and bankruptcy filing
rates. He notes that the rate of consumer bankruptcies is "astonishingly highly
correlated with the rise in credit card defaults."" Professor Ausubel explains:
The profit margins of credit card issuers substantially increased beginning in
1982, as a result of the functional deregulation of credit card interest rates
coupled with prevalent consumer behavior. This has created incentives for
card issuers to relax their credit standards, in turn leading to a secular
increase in the rate of credit card defaults.
2
When the cards are highly profitable, credit card issuers have a strong incentive
to distribute them to marginal borrowers and to borrowers already loaded with
debts, which increases both the issuer's profits and its loan defaults. Card
profitability may increase for a number of reasons. About three-quarters of credit
card revenues come from interest payments, 3 so profitability increases if the
same customers increase their debt levels, if new customers begin to carry debt,
or if the rates the company charges increase more than their cost of funds. Any
one of these routes to profitability could also be a route to bankruptcy, and
Professor Ausubel demonstrates that high credit card profitability correlates
closely with increases in defaults and bankruptcies.
Research by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") demonstrates
the same correlation, observing that interest rate deregulation in the mid-i 980s
led to a substantial expansion in credit availability and an increase in personal
bankruptcies. 4 The FDIC concludes: "A tightly regulated world, marked by a
low level of personal bankruptcies and restricted access to credit, was exchanged
for a deregulated world marked by expanded access to consumer credit and a
higher level of personal bankruptcies."'"
The CBO data, the Bhandari and Weiss data, the Ausubel data, and the FDIC
research all demonstrate the correlation between rising levels of consumer debt
9. See id. at 1-5.
10. See id. at 37.
11. Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71
AM. BANKR. L.J. 249,250 (1997).
12. Id at 251.
13. Finance charges contributed 75.1% of credit card revenues of Visa and MasterCard
issuers in the second quarter of 1992. See DAVID S. EvANs & RICHARD L. SCHMALENSEE, THE
EcoNoMIcs OF THE PAYMENT CARD INDUsTRY 55 fig.3 (1993) (citing data from the Visa
U.S.A., Inc. Profit Analysis Report (quarter ending June 30, 1992)); see also Lawrence M.
Ausubel, The Credit Card Market, Revisited 24 n.31 (July 20, 1995) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
14. See Diane Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on Credit Card
Volumes, Charge-Offs, and the Personal Bankruptcy Rate, BANK TRENDs (Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 1998, at 1.
15. Id.
1998] 1083
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and rising bankruptcy rates. The simple explanation of the rise in filings-
bankruptcies rise as household debt rises-is undeniable. As their packs get
heavier, more Americans fall and cannot get back on their feet without lightening
their loads.
B. Why So Much Debt?
Why have Americans taken on so much consumer debt relative to their
incomes? Some incur the debt with little thought about how it adds up, perhaps
like the grasshopper who never thought about the coming winter. Others take on
substantial debt, but they keep it within manageable ranges until an unavoidable
financial obligation-a significant medical bill or a car accident-pushes the
aggregate debts to staggering levels. Still others have large debts they could
maintain until they were downsized out of a well-paying job or faced a cutback
on overtime. The mismatch between debt and income, either because the debts
rose or the income fell, is fundamental to debtors' economic collapse.
There are many rocks along the hiking trail that can cause economic collapse.
My coauthors, Dr. Teresa Sullivan and Professor Jay Westbrook, and I have tried
to identify specifically the fractures in middle-class economic stability that have
led to the debt-income imbalances that force so many debtors into bankruptcy.
In our forthcoming book, The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Financial
Crisis, we explore debtors' own explanations for their economic failures along
with data on economic pressures on most Americans. A detailed analysis of the
kinds of problems that trigger the economic -collapse of more than a million
families each year is beyond the scope of this paper. For this paper, the focus is
on the allegation that the rise in consumer bankruptcy can be attributed to rising
consumer abuse of the bankruptcy system.
II. EVIDENCE OF ABUSE
Notwithstanding the strong statistical evidence that the rise in consumer
bankruptcy filings is linked to the increase in debt loads per household, the credit
industry-and many other observers-place the blame for the rise in filings on
increased consumer abuse. According to this view, increasing willingness of
American families to take advantage of their creditors by filing bankruptcy has
prompted the increase in consumer filings. To sustain this assertion, however, it
is essential to develop evidence of systematic abuse. Outrageous anecdotes may
highlight legal loopholes that should be closed, but they cannot constitute the
sole basis for radical changes to the policy and structure of an entire system.'
For example, if the law permits an individual to convey all her property to a self-
settled trust while she shields millions of dollars from her creditors, the practice
must be curtailed even if it is a rare event because it is unfair to creditors and a
violation of underlying bankruptcy principles. Indeed, the National Bankruptcy
16. For a discussion of legislation-by-anecdote in the bankruptcy field, see Teresa A.
Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, The Use of Empirical Data in Formulating
Bankruptcy Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 195.
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Review Commission recommended a number of changes to the consumer
bankruptcy system that fit this category: there was no evidence that the identified
abusive practices were widespread, but the bankruptcy code should not condone
certain kinds of debtor and creditor behavior.
The current national debate is premised on the existence of a crisis. By the
terms of the current debate, significant changes in the structure and policy
underpinnings of the present system are justified by a calamitous rise in filings
that signals widespread abuse. To presume a crisis from only the cold filing
numbers is too broad a logical leap. Some form of systematic abuse must be
demonstrated. If the system is experiencing occasional abuses at the margin, then
the debate-and the proposed solutions-should be shaped very differently.
A. Macrodata
At the outset, an allegation of widespread abuse will be difficult to document
because the available macrodata offer an adequate explanation for the rise in
consumer bankruptcies. One can fully account for the current rise in filings and
leave no room for the inference that the rise is prompted by abusive filers. If
debtors behave precisely as they have for decades-declaring bankruptcy more
often when they carry more debt and declaring bankruptcy less often when they
carry less debt-the rise in consumer filings is entirely predictable. Since the rise
in consumer filings is a predictable function of debt, then the rise in filings
should have been considerably sharper if the system were now rife with abuse.
To rebut the inference that the rise is linked to increased debt loads, as it has
been for decades, evidence of abuse must be strong enough to demonstrate
enough systematic abuse to account for a significant rise in filings.
The major effort to develop macroeconomic evidence of some less-mentioned
causes of bankruptcy was a study initiated by Visa, Inc. 7 The study examined
"[o]ver 65 macroeconomic and social variables with potential explanatory value
•.. to explain trends in personal bankruptcy filings both at the state and national
levels."' 8 The study covered a sixteen-year period, and purports to explain "99
percent of the variation in bankruptcy filing trends."' 9 The study hints only
indirectly at widespread abuse in its conclusion that a significant portion of the
rise in consumer filings is based on unmeasured "social factors" such as
"changes in the bankruptcy laws, the reduced stigma associated with filing for
personal bankruptcy and broader advertising of legal assistance with bankruptcy
filings."2 Visa concedes that "[m]any social factors are not easily quantifiable,
as consistent, historical data do not exist."'" To deal with this lack of data, the
Visa researchers simply assumed that anything that could not be explained by
other economic variables must be attributable to those of social variables.
17. See generally VISA U.S.A., INC., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY: CAUsES AND IMPLICATIONS
(1996).
18.Id. at 1.
19. Id.
20.Id. at 13.
21. Id.
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This study was submitted to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission to
support the adoption of credit-supported means testing, evidently on the
assumption that evidence of the effects of social variables, which combine such
factors as lawyer advertising and declining stigma, suggest a constellation of
abuse.22 The Commission in turn asked the CBO to review the study. A review
by Mr. Kowalewski, Chief, Financial and General Macroeconomic Analysis
Unit, Macroeconomic Analysis Division, CBO, concluded that the method of
analysis employed by the Visa researchers was "unsound"' and reported that
"[t]he results of my analysis suggest the opposite-the model is misspecified and
hence is an unreliable explanation of personal bankruptcy filings .... I also
found the report's claim about the importance of 'social factors' that Visa
believes affect personal bankruptcy filings to be unfounded."'24 Even a modest,
indirect claim of rising abuse could not be sustained by the macrodata.25
22. See id. Of course, some might see increased access to lawyers and awareness of legal
rights as an indication that the system is functioning more nearly as it was initially intended.
23. Memorandum, "Evaluations of Three Studies Submitted to the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission," from Kim J. Kowalewski to Brady Williamson, Chairman, National
Bankruptcy Review Commission 1 (Oct. 6, 1997).
24. Id Kowalewski notes that although Visa admits it cannot measure "social factors," Visa
nonetheless concludes that a decline in social stigma, increased legal advertising, and increased
availability to debtors who have declared bankruptcy in the past play an important role in
bankruptcy filings. Kowalewski explains:
Visa bases its conclusion on the apparent statistical significance and positive
sign of the coefficient on their variable USTREND [Visa's "social" variable].
However, this variable does not measure any of these social factors; it is a simple
trend that bears no necessary relationship to these factors.
The figure on the next page displays the variable USTREND and the number
of personal bankruptcy filings per 1000 adults, both from the Visa data set. Even
though they had no observations on the various social factors they cited, Visa
assumed that the social factors behaved in a surprising way: the factors were
assumed to have been unchanged between the fourth quarter of 1980 and the first
quarter of 1985 and between the seconid quarter of 1992 and the first quarter of
1996, but to have risen between these two periods. Visa's report does not explain
how they arrived at this unusual assumption, but the close correspondence
between the two series, particularly the dates when the trends in the two series
change, strongly suggests that USTREND was constructed specifically to follow
the trends in the personal bankruptcy rate. Consequently, Visa's conclusion about
the importance of social factors is unfounded. By defining their social trends
proxy to mimic the broad trends of the variable they were attempting to explain,
they arrived at their conclusion by assumption.
Id. at 6-7 (footnote omitted). In the footnote, Kowalewski commented, "[iut is interesting to
observe that because the social trends variable is flat during 1995 and early 1996, Visa believes
that their social factors played no role behind the increase in personal bankruptcy filings in that
period." Id. at 6 n.4.
25. Visa officials responded angrily to the CBO analysis of their work. The Senior Vice
President of Visa wrote the Chairman of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
demanding that the report from CBO be suppressed and charging that the analysis of the study
had been made in secret. See Letter from Thomas A. Layman, Senior Vice President, Visa
U.S.A., Inc., to Brady Williamson, Chairman, National Bankruptcy Review Commission (Oct.
14, 1997) (on file with author). Visa subcontractors who conducted the research also wrote to
[Vol. 73:10791086
THE BANKRUPTCY CRISIS
As the Visa efforts demonstrate, identifying the variables that will demonstrate
abuse can be exceedingly difficult. One reason is that the very concept of abuse
is slippery. One person's example of abuse may be another person's legitimate
use of the system. Filing bankruptcy on the eve of a home mortgage foreclosure
is, in the eyes of some, an abusive use of bankruptcy and, in the eyes of others,
a legitimate use of a statutory provision designed to halt debt collection. Without
venturing deeply into the heavily moralistic debate about the elements of abuse,
there appears to be some joinder in the debates that has created a working
definition of abuse: if debtors use bankruptcy when they could repay their debts,
then they have abused the system and have imposed costs on their bill-paying
counterparts who do not declare bankruptcy. The central idea is that people who
use bankruptcy ought to be those in serious financial trouble.
B. Microdata
The microdata26 suggest that the people who file for bankruptcy generally are
those who need it. The work of my coauthors, Dr. Teresa Sullivan and Professor
Jay Westbrook, and I show this to be the case. In the early 1990s, for example,
the typical family filed for bankruptcy with an annual combined income of about
$21,200 (in 1997 dollars),27 compared with a median family income of about
$42,400 (in 1997 dollars) for those not in bankruptcy." For many, their incomes
represented a sharp drop over the preceding year as they coped with
unemployment, downsizing, and self-employment as independent contractors.29
At the same time, their debts were staggering, far outstripping debt loads for
most Americans.3" The ratio of consumer debt-to-income (which omits home
mortgage debt), shows that at the median these debtors owed more than their
annual income to doctors, hospitals, credit card issuers, finance companies, and
protest the criticisms. See Mark Lauritano, WEFA Group, A Rebuttal to Kim J. Kowalewski's
"Evaluation on Three Studies Submitted to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission"
Dated October 6, 1997 (no date) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
26. Microdata are data developed from debtors' files on a case-by-case basis and added
together to create a statistical profile of the average debtor.
27. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Consumer Debtors Ten
Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J.
121, 128 tbl.1 (1994) (reporting on a 1991 empirical study of consumer debtors) [hereinafter
Ten Years Later]. The text reports median income in order to be comparable to the census data,
which report only median incomes. The mean income in 1981 was somewhat higher at
$23,927. All the numbers have been recalculated to 1997 to adjust for the effects of inflation.
To translate a number gathered in 1991 to 1997 dollars, it was multiplied by 1.1784141.
28. To calculate this, we relied on BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1994 at 469 tbl.715 (1994) (displaying table
entitled "Money Income of Families-Median Income, by Race and Hispanic Origin, In
Current and Constant (1991) Dollars: 1970-1992"), and we reported the data in 1997 constant
dollars.
29. See Ten Years Later, supra note 27, at 129-33.
30. See id. at 135.
1998] 1087
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
other consumer lenders." On average, they owed so much in short-term, high-
interest debt that every fifth paycheck would have to be used exclusively for
interest payments on their debts just to stay even.32 If they could not afford to
give up one paycheck every five weeks, then they would simply fall deeper into
debt even if they never incurred another doctor's bill or another credit card
charge or picked up any new rocks.
These data sketch a bleak picture for the typical debtor in bankruptcy, which
is reported in far more detail elsewhere,33 but the data offer only indirect
information on abuse. These data suggest that any abuse is confined to few
enough debtors that they affect neither the mean nor the median financial reports
emerging from the bankruptcy courts.
To say, however, that most of the debtors are in financial trouble does not
definitively answer the question of whether consumers abuse the bankruptcy
system. The credit industry has funded its own microdata analysis of consumer
bankruptcy that has been the primary basis for its bankruptcy reform efforts.
Continuing its longtime affiliation with the Credit Research Center .("CRC"), 4
originally located at Purdue University and recently relocated to Georgetown
University with its director, Michael Staten, the credit industry commissioned a
study of debtors who filed for bankruptcy in 1996."5
The credit industry study purported to test directly whether debtors in Chapter
7 "could have funded meaningful Chapter 13 repayment plans" by.examining the
31. See id at 128-39. The article includes detailed reports about the incomes, assets, debt,
debt-to-income ratios, and other financial information about the debtors who filed in
bankruptcy both in 1991 and 1981.
32. Actually, it may be too optimistic to estimate that debtors in bankruptcy would have to
devote only every fifth paycheck to pay the interest on their outstanding consumer debt.
Despite low inflation, average interest rates climbed at least one percentage point during 1997,
putting the rate at 18.8%, according to one industry research firm, RAM Research. According
to the same research company, penalty charges have gone up more than 50% during the year.
For customers who have been late on the payments, as many bankruptcy debtors presumably
have been, interest rates go as high as 30% in some banks. Associates National Bank in Dallas,
for example, sets a 29.99% interest rate for its highest-risk customers, according to bank
officials. See Karen Hube, Now, Time to Dig Out from 1997 Debt, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1998,
at 17. If the debtors who file for bankruptcy had been using credit from the subprime market,
they could have been facing interest rates as high as 40%. See Robyn Meredith, Will Ford
Become the New Repo Man?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1996, at Al. If the debtors in bankruptcy
were obligated to pay interest rates that exceeded the national averages, they would have to
devote an even larger share of their income to interest charges.
33. See Ten Years Later, supra note 27, at 138 tbl.3. Again, the median debt-to-income
ratio is reported in the text, this time for comparability with the income figures. The mean debt-
to-income ratio is higher at 1.62, meaning that, at the mean, a debtor in bankruptcy owed about
a year and seven months' income in short-term, high-interest debt.
34. The credit industry has paid the CRC to conduct a number of studies, such as a study
on the effects of postbankruptcy credit on bankruptcy filings and the effect of waiving finance
charges in credit counseling. Perhaps the best-known study commissioned by the credit
industry from CRC is the 1981 study often referred to as the Purdue Report. See discussion
infra note 66.
35. See John M. Barron & Michael E. Staten, Personal Bankruptcy: A Report on
Petitioners' Ability-to-Pay (Oct. 6, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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incomes and debts of debtors currently in Chapter 7.36 The study collected
detailed information from 4000 files in major American cities and assembled the
data to construct direct evidence of abuse.37 As such, the study focused more
tightly than other studies on the working definition of abuse-ability to repay.
The credit industry study used information from the debtors' reports of their
incomes and expenses, but the researchers calculated "ability to repay" by
including some expenses and excluding others from the reported family budget.
So, for example, a debtor's continuing payments on certain secured debts, such
as car loans or appliance loans, were omitted from a debtor's budget expenses
unless a formal reaffirmation could be found in the files; continuing payments
of nondischargeable debt, such as educational loans, evidently were also
omitted.38 All household expenses were assumed to hold constant for five years,
with no adjustment for inflation or addition of a budget entry to pay car repairs
or future emergencies.39 Family income was computed from all sources, including
alimony and income from a small business. Each debtor's income was assumed
to continue without interruption even though the report indicates that more than
68% of the debtors experienced an "income decline" suggesting a period of
unemployment prior to filing.!' Debts were calculated without interest charges,
including the debts that were reaffirmed. Matching income-after-adjusted-
expenses to the listed debts, the credit industry study concluded that 40% of the
debtors could pay at least a dollar of debt, and that over a five-year period,
13.7% of the unsecured debt listed by this 44% of the Chapter 7 debtors in
bankruptcy could be repaid.4 The report concluded that even more families could
pay if they sold their cars and their furniture."2
The credit industry's press releases widely touted the finding that 40% of
debtors could repay some of their debts. This assertion made it into the popular
press as a "fact" without attribution to its origin. Newsweek magazine, for
example, ran an article entitled "Deadbeat Nation" in which it noted that
creditors blame debtor abuse for the rise in bankruptcies: "one study says 45
percent of bankruptcy filers could pay back much of their debt.1 3 Nowhere does
the article point out that the quoted statistic comes from the industry's own study.
Three months later, The Los Angeles Times, lamenting creditor abuse said,
"[m]uch of [consumers'] debt relief is simply unwarranted. Experts say that
about 45% of Americans who seek complete relief from their debts through
36. Id. at2.
37. See id. at6.
38. I say "evidently" because the explanation of what was omitted from the expense
category was not always clear. It would appear, for example, by reading the table of expenses
that car loans were always included because of the entry made in Table 5. See id. at 17 tbl.5.
It is only in the text several pages away that it is possible to infer that only reaffirmed debts
were included in the expense calculation. See id. at 11-12.
39. Because the documentation is so slim, it is difficult to know exactly how the credit
industry's researchers calculated expenses; I have made guesses based on the reported
information.
40. See Barron & Staten, supra note 35, at 9-10.
41. See id. at 25 & tbl.11, 26 tbl.12.
42. See id. at28 tbl.14.
43. Daniel McGinn, Deadbeat Nation, NEWsWEEK, Apr. 14, 1997, at 50, 50.
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Chapter 7 personal bankruptcy filings could afford to pay off an average of one-
third of their debts within three years."" Again, there is no indication in the piece
that the only "experts" who claim such numbers are those funded by the credit
industry. USA Today picked up the same information for its editorial on
consumer bankruptcy: "Purdue University researchers found a third of debtors
could pay some of their bills but don't."4 Former Senator Lloyd Bentsen wrote
an op-ed for The Washington Times proclaiming, "[a]ccording to a Purdue
University study, nearly half of the people who file for bankruptcy could repay
a significant amount of their outstanding obligations, but instead choose to
renege."46 Mr. Bentsen also failed to disclose in his op-ed that he had been hired
earlier that month by the credit industry to lobby his former colleagues in the
Senate to adopt harsher bankruptcy laws. His conclusions about bankruptcy
abuse were cited in turn by Congressman Gekas in his press release
accompanying introduction of a means-tested bankruptcy bill, again without
notation of Mr. Bentsen's lobbyist status or the credit industry as the source of
the underlying research.47
While it does not highlight this finding, the credit industry report indicates
what proportion of the debt listed in Chapter 7 would be repaid. If each debtor
were examined in a complex infrastructure at no cost to the creditors, and if all
the optimistic assumptions of the credit industry researchers held true, the
industry could collect about 1.2 1% of its outstanding "nonhousing debt" each
year for five years. 8 It is interesting to speculate whether this return would
44. Editorial, 'Last Resort'Is Coming First, L.A. TIMEs, July 28, 1997, at B4.
45. Editorial, Lax Bankruptcy Laws Make Everyone Pay, USA TODAY, June 12, 1997, at
14A.
46. Lloyd Bentsen, Editorial, Get Tough on Bankruptcy Laws, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1997, at Al9.
47. See Press Release, Statement of Chairman George W. Gekas, Judicial Subcommittee
on Commercial and Administrative Law, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, OFFICE OF U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE GEORGE W. GEKAS, Feb. 3, 1998, at 3-4 (on file with author).
48. The study's report of the data are not entirely clear, but it appears that the yearly
repayment is summed to show a total repayment of 13.7%, and the number reported in the text
is calculated from this number. See Barron & Staten, supra note 35, at 26 tbl.12. The reported
five-year repayment of 13.7% of the debt for 44% of the Chapter 7 debtors, works out to 2.7%
per creditor for each of the nonhousing creditors (as classified by the report). This figure was
reached as follows. There are 2441 Chapter 7 filers in the study, see id. at 7 tbl.2, of whom
44% can repay something, see id. at 25. Thus, 2441 * 0.44 = 1074 can repay. The mean
repayment available is $6848, see id. at 26 tbl.12; thus the total that can be repaid is $6848 *
1074, or $7,354,752. The authors report that the $6848 payment represents 13.7% repayment
over 5 years. See id. The $7,354,752 is 13.7% of $53,684,321, which we may take to be the
unpaid nonhousing, nonpriority debt of the "can pay" debtors.
The figure of $53 million approximates a number that we can reach independently by adding
up the mean nonhousing debt figures from Table 8 and multiplying by 1074: $5992 vehicle
debt + $2885 other secured debt + $41,228 unsecured debt = $50,105 mean debt of the can-
pays. See id at 21 tbl.8. Multiplied by the 1074 debtors, the figure is $53,812,770. Duplicating
the $53 million figure in this way suggests that the mean figures in Table 8 are intended to be
applied more generally, so we will continue with a few more applications.
Continuing with the assumption that the mean debt figures presented in Table 8 apply to the
entire sample and not just the can-pay debtors, then $50,105 * 2441 (total sample) yields a total
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outweigh the administrative costs to the creditors of maintaining an open,
interest-free account for five years. In order to produce that return for the
creditors, the taxpayers would be charged with building an elaborate bureaucratic
structure to review the debtors' files and with providing hearings for debtors who
dispute their creditors' claims that they could repay. Whether the increase in
administrative costs, including trustee fees, debtors' and creditors' lawyers' fees,
court costs, filing and tracking costs, and mailing costs would outweigh any
increase in creditor collection is beyond the scope of the credit industry study.
The credit industry pressed its study, then only in interim form, on both the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission and on Congress. Some concerns
about the repayment data led members of Congress and the Chair of the
Commission to request technical reviews of the study. Both the CBO and the
General Accounting Office ("GAO"), in their roles evaluating statistical
information bearing on policy questions for Congress, reviewed the credit
industry study. The CBO review, conducted by Kim Kowalewski, Chief,
Financial and General Macroeconomic Analysis Unit, Macroeconomic Analysis
Division, raised concerns about the abbreviated reporting of the data that "make
it impossible to determine the reliability of the study's findings."49 The analysis
raised questions regarding unfounded assumptions about current income, future
income, current expenses, future expenses, amount of indebtedness, the
representativeness of the sample, data-collection techniques, sample weighting
methods, and inaccurate data comparisons."0 For multiple reasons therefore, the
CBO report concluded that the credit industry study was "misleading" and it
"overstat[ed]" capacity to repay."' The coauthor of the study, Michael Staten,
made an angry rebuttal to the CBO analysis before the report was made public. 2
Later, Mr. Kowalewski reviewed Dr. Staten's comments, and further analyzed
nonpriority, nonhousing debt for the sample of $122,306,305 total debt owed. The repayment
figure of $7 million is thus 6% of the $122 million owed. Spread over 5 years, see id. at 26
tbl. 12, this amounts to 1.2% of the debt paid each year. In terms of the total debt owed, this
sum is trivial.
In terms of the can-pay debtors, on the other hand, the repayment is considerable. Again
working from the mean figures in the tables, this sum amounts to about $114 a month ($6848
over 60 months, or $1368 for 12 months) or about 8% of their mean net annual take-home pay
of $16,470. See id. at 16 tbl.4. Looking at their annual budgets, see id. at 17 tbl.5, which
already exceed the net take-home by $7739, it is not clear how the debtors could further
economize, but here are some possibilities:
" they could eliminate most transportation ($1425);
" they could eliminate one-third of their food expenditures of $4052;
" they could eliminate laundry ($404) AND clothing ($846); or
" they could eliminate a telephone ($713) AND medical and dental expenses ($623).
49. Kowalewski, supra note 23, at 8.
50. See id. at 8-10.
51. Id. at 9.
52. See Letter from Michael Staten, Director, CRC, to Brady Williamson, Chairman,
National Bankruptcy Review Commission 1 (Oct. 14, 1997) (on file with author) (explaining
that he had been "informed" of the CBO review on October 6). The CBO review was made
public on October 20 when the report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission was
published.
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some new data presented, discovering added evidence that the study "overstate[s
the debtors'] repayment capacity." 3
With a broader time frame in which it could review the study, the GAO could
make an even more detailed assessment that raised additional questions regarding
unfounded assumptions about both current and future income, calculation of
expenses, and accuracy of the debt figures. 4 In addition, the GAO report raised
questions about sampling techniques and data collection."5 Like the CBO, the
GAO noted that because the report contains too little basic statistical
information, "standard statistical methods, such as the calculation of statistical
error rates, cannot be used to evaluate the likely accuracy of the results." 6 The
GAO report expressed concern that the report overstated debtors' ability to
repay. 7 The GAO report concluded that the "[s]tudy's [flundamental
[a]ssumptions [w]ere [n]ot [v]alidated" and that the credit industry report does
"not provide a.sound basis" for its conclusion about how many debtors in
bankruptcy could repay their debts." A number of academics who reviewed
preliminary reports of the study reached a similar conclusion. 9
Once again, Dr. Staten published a detailed rebuttal to the report even before
the report was made public. Dr. Staten's rebuttal, published on the American
Bankruptcy Institute's web page as early as January 26, 1998, preceded the
public release of the GAO report by more than a week.' The response, however,
does not address manyof the objections raised by the GAO report, a point noted
by the GAO.
When the credibility of the CRC study was challenged, the credit industry
responded by hiring more studies. The industry paid accounting firm Ernst &
53. Memorandum, "Follow-Up Comments on Dr. Staten's Study," from Kim J.
Kowalewski, to Brady Williamson, Chairman, National Bankruptcy Review Commission 3
(Oct. 10, 1997) (on file with author).
54. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTNG OFFicE, GAO/GGD-98-47, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: THE
CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER REPORTON DEBTORS' ABILITY TO PAY 1 (1998) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT].
55. See id. at 2-6.
56.1d. at6.
57. See, e.g., id. at 4-5.
58. Id. at6.
59. See Letter from Ian Domowitz, Professor, Department of Economics and Institute for
Policy Research, Northwestern University, to Brady Williamson, Chairman, National
Bankruptcy Review Commission 3 (June 9, 1997) (on file with author) (questioning the study's
calculations and concluding "Dr. Staten should make the full data set available to the
Commission itself, which can then decide how best to go about verifying the results"); Letter
from Professors Marianne Culhane & Michaela White, Creighton University School of Law,
to Brady Williamson, Chairman, National Bankruptcy Review Commission 1 (June 11, 1997)
(on file-with author) (providing a detailed analysis of data collection and concluding that the
"VISA study seriously overstates the repayment capacity of most chapter 7 debtors");
Statement of Professor William C. Whitford, University of Wisconsin School of Law, to the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission (Jan. 23, 1997) (on file with author) (explaining
deficiencies in the data in sampling and calculations).
60. See John M. Barron & Michael E. Staten, Response to GAO by Credit Research Center
Authors, available in American Bankr. Inst., ABI World: Reports & Testimony (visited May
25, 1998) <http://www.abiworld.org/research/researchfront.html>.
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Young ("E&Y") to corroborate the CRC study. The GAO included the E&Y
work in its analysis, concluding that the E&Y study suffered from the same
deficiencies as the CRC study.6' Undeterred, the credit industry paid for yet
another study to be released as the GAO was making its unfavorable report on
the earlier studies.62 This study, by WEFA Group, purported to make a
"conservative" estimate of the losses imposed by the bankruptcy system. At the
request of Congress, the GAO evaluated this study in detail, concluding once
again that the validity of the study was not established.63 The GAO was critical
of the assumptions used in the study, the methodology employed, the lack of
documentation, and the breadth of the conclusions.'
The CBO and GAO reviews of the CRC study sponsored by the credit industry
are reminiscent of the credit industry's prior efforts to collect data to persuade
Congress and the public of the existence of a bankruptcy crisis. Claiming that the
rise in consumer bankruptcies in the early 1980s demonstrated abuse of a liberal
new bankruptcy law, the credit industry lobbied Congress to restrict Chapter 7
eligibility by adopting a means test. The resulting bill, S. 2000, was highly
controversial, and the credit industry turned to the same CRC to develop a study
to demonstrate debtor abuse. The study, quickly distributed in Congress and
widely quoted in the press, 65 purported to show that more than thirty percent of
the bankrupt debtors could have repaid their debts in full and that $1.1 billion
was discharged each year by debtors who could have repaid.' There was no CBO
or GAO review of the 1981 credit industry study, but my coauthors, Teresa
Sullivan and Jay Westbrook, and I reviewed that study.67 We concluded:
The Purdue Study purports to be a scientific study, offering only "sterile"
data. As a scientific study it is deeply flawed. The Study lacks crucial
expertise, is designed incorrectly, asks a series of inartful questions, gathers
61. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTiNG OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-98-79, PERSONAL BANKRUpTCY: THE
CREDrr RESEARCH CENTER AND ERNsT & YOUNG REPORTS ON DEBTORS' ABILITY TO PAY 6-9,
11-12 (1998) (testimony of Richard M. Stana, Associate Director, Administration of Justice
Issues, General Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office).
62. See WEFA GROUP, THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY (1998).
63. See Letter from Richard M. Stana, Associate Director, Administration of Justice Issues,
U.S. General Accounting Office, to Hon. Martin T. Meehan, U.S. House of Representatives
5 (Apr. 23, 1998) (on file with author).
64. For this review, there were no angry denials by the authors. The GAO reports, "We
attempted to discuss our observations about the report with the WEFA report's authors, but
were unable to reach anyone to do so." Ial at 1.
65. For a brief discussion of the credit industry's earlier efforts to persuade Congress to
adopt a means test for all debtors in bankruptcy, see Elizabeth Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy
Protection for Consumers: A Response, 72 GEO. L.J. 1333 (1984). The credit industry
"simultaneously commissioned a study of bankrupt debtors, hired a prestigious Madison
Avenue advertising firm to publicize the results of the study, and lobbied for federal legislation
to remedy the problems that it was certain the study would reveal." Id. at 1333 n.4.
66. See 1 CREDrr RESEARCH CrR., PURDUEUNiV., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY 88-91
(1982). The figure was initially reported as $1.6 billion and then corrected to $1.1 billion after
the report was published, but both numbers continued to circulate through the halls of
Congress.
67. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Limiting Access to
Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 WIs. L. REv. 1091.
19981 1093
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
its data improperly, misanalyzes the statistical data and draws erroneous and
biased inferences from the data analysis. Moreover, error after error increases
the count of the debtors who "could pay" and the amount of debt that could
be recovered under S. 2000.61
This critique came too late to have any meaningful influence on the debates, but
the credit industry was not successful in persuading Congress to adopt a means
test. Nonetheless, the credit industry got its money's worth. The bankruptcy laws
were amended to include a package of credit industry proposals that made
bankruptcy more difficult for individuals and permitted creditors to seek debt
reaffirmation more aggressively.69 With bankruptcy filings approaching 300,000,
Congress and the public were persuaded that there was a bankruptcy crisis
requiring a credit-industry-proposed solution.
The credit industry study has been discredited, but there is another approach
using microdata to detect rising consumer abuse. Data collected over time can
help detect shifts in the population of people who declare bankruptcy. If the
sharp rise in consumer bankruptcies is attributable to a sharp increase in debtor
abuse, then the basic financial profiles of the filers ought to change over time:
the addition of more affluent debtors should increase both the mean and the
median incomes or lower the relative size of the debts, demonstrating their
relatively better ability to repay debts.
To test the hypothesis that an increase in debtor abuse accounts for the rise in
bankruptcy filings, it is possible to compare the financial profiles of the debtors
who filed over a seventeen-year period: 1981, 1991, 1995, and 1997. The 1981
data are from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, a study my coauthors and I
conducted of 1557 debtors in ten judicial districts. This study is reported in detail
in our book, As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in
America.70 The 1991 data are from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project II, a study
by the same authors of 2400 debtors in sixteen districts for which we collected
additional financial information for about 750 debtors in five of the districts.
Details of this study are reported in Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A
68. Id at 1145 (footnote omitted). One of the CRC researchers responded to the critique,
claiming that the study's estimate that $1.1 billion in debt is discharged that could be repaid
was defensible. See A. Charlene Sullivan, Reply: Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge,
1984 Wis. L. REV. 1069. We argued in a rejoinder that the CRC's own data seriously
undermined the study's widely publicized claims and that the defense of the study did not
restore its credibility. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook,
Rejoinder: Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1087 [hereinafter
Rejoinder].
69. For a discussion of the connection between the credit industry's 1981 study and the
subsequent adoption of creditor-sponsored amendments to the bankruptcy code, see Rejoinder,
supra note 68, at 1087-103.
70. As WE FORGIVE, supra note 2. The ten districts studied were the Northern District of
Illinois, the Central District of Illinois, the Southern District of Illinois, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the Central District of Pennsylvania, the Western District of Pennsylvania, the
Eastern District of Texas, the Western District of Texas, the Southern District of Texas, and the
Northern District of Texas.
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Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991. " The 1995 data were
developed by Professors Marianne Culhane and Michaela White as part of the
Bankruptcy Reaffirmation Project. They collected data on more than a thousand
Chapter 7 cases drawn from seven districts. A larger report of their findings will
be forthcoming in later scholarly publications, but they were willing to make debt
and income data available from their study to make the multi-year study
possible.72 The 1997 data come from the efforts of the Honorable Barbara
Sellers, Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District of Ohio. She provided
detailed raw data from a sample of 150 cases filed in 1997 in the Southern
District of Ohio, which I analyzed for this comparison.73 The comparisons are
illustrated in Figure 2 on the following page and reported in more detail in Table
1 of the Appendix. 4
71. Ten Years Later, supra note 27. The 16 districts studied were the 10 of the 1981 study
plus the Northern District of California, the Central District of California, the Eastern District
of California, the Southern District of California, the Middle District of Tennessee, and the
Western District of Tennessee.
72. Professors' Culhane and White randomly sampled cases from seven districts: the
Northern District of California, the District of Colorado, the Northern District of Georgia, the
District of Massachusetts, the District of Nebraska, the Middle District of North Carolina, the
Western District of Wisconsin. The researchers analyzed 1050 cases either filed or later
converted to Chapter 7. The sample was limited to cases filed by an individual or married
couple in calendar year 1995, in which schedules had been filed. For the analysis presented
here, outliers were eliminated from the sample following the same protocols as Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook in As WE FORGIVE, supra note 2, with dollar figures adjusted for
inflation, to enhance the comparability of the data. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M.
White, Preliminary Results of the Bankruptcy Reaffirmation Project 3 (Sept. 25, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); data reported infra on tables in Appendix.
73. The 1997 database was constructed from data supplied by the Honorable Barbara
Sellers. She selected the first 100 Chapter 13 cases and the first 50 Chapter 7 cases assigned
to her during 1997. Every case in that group was studied. Assignment of cases in the Southern
District of Ohio is random among the judges. Judge Sellers used only her own cases in order
to eliminate any differences in outcomes that might be influenced by the judge.
Judge Sellers recorded about 75 pieces of information for each case. We received her
handwritten sheets of information in June 1997. Following the same protocols that were used
to code and report data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project Phase I and Phase II, we coded
the data into machine-readable form. The codes for the reasons for bankruptcy are on file with
the authors.
Becase Judge Sellers's selection of cases produced a disproportionate share of Chapter 13
cases, analysis of the data from this district was weighted in the 75-25 proportion of Chapter
7 to Chapter 13 cases that existed in 1997 in her district. In order to enhance the accessibility
of our data for other researchers, we did not sample the Chapter 13 cases, employing instead
a straightforward weighting process. For this report, however, the comparison is among
Chapter 7 cases exclusively, so there is no need to weight the data.
74. Figure 2 is a graphic representation of the data presented in more detail in Table I in
the Appendix.
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FIGURE 2
Median Income in 1997 Dollars of Ch. 7 Debtors
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The income comparisons reported here represent comparable data obtained
directly from the files of debtors scattered across the country. The data are from
cases filed in the identified year, reported here in constant 1997 dollars to correct
for the effects of inflation. The financial information recorded gives a baseline
profile about the families who file for bankruptcy.
The comparisons are not ideal. If we had had more funding, my coauthors and
I would have collected data from more districts initially and we would have
continued to collect data from these districts over time. The 1981 and 1991 data
reported here are from the same three districts in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and
Texas. The 1995 data are from California, Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. The 1997 data are from Ohio. Because
we have both different districts and different time periods in some of the studies,
it is difficult to determine whether the differences were caused because Ohio
differed from Texas or whether a 1981 sample differed from a 1997 sample or
both. Moreover, it is always difficult to rely on the analysis of a limited number
of districts; the districts sampled may differ from all the other districts that were
1096 [Vol. 73:1079
THE BANKRUPTCY CRISIS
not sampled." Nonetheless, the comparison among the eleven districts is a little
like lighting a candle; it provides limited light and it is more productive than
cursing the darkness.7 6
Notwithstanding the limitations of the data, the suggestion of a trend is strong:
since 199 1, the incomes of the debtors in bankruptcy have declined. If there were
growing widespread abuse, the debtors who filed in later years should be on
average somewhat more prosperous than their counterparts who filed earlier.
Instead, income among the pool of bankruptcy debtors declines significantly.
These data strongly suggest that the debtors as a group are in worse financial
condition when they file for bankruptcy, as least as measured by income.
Of course, poorer debtors might still abuse the system. If debtors' incomes
were declining, but their debts were declining even faster, these debtors might
be accused of taking "bankruptcies of convenience." Such a decline in debt
relative to income might suggest that an increase in abusive filings accounts for
the rise in bankruptcies. Instead, however, these data suggest that not only are the
debtors' incomes declining, their debt-to-income ratios are not improving."
75. Although it is more expensive, we are able to correct for another statistical problem:
the possibility of inaccurate sampling of the district chosen. In each district we sampled, we
took proportionate cases from all places in which cases were filed. This means, for example,
that our sample of cases from the Northern District of Texas includes cases from Dallas, Ft.
Worth, and Lubbock. Any researcher who goes only to the major city risks biasing the sample
to represent only filers in large metropolitan areas and not their counterparts in more remote
locations who may, in fact, differ sharply. This appears to be one of many problems with
sample selection in the most recent credit industry study which appears to be based on samples
from only one location for each district Barron & Staten, supra note 35, at 7, seems to say that
all data collections took place in the identified major cities, thereby eliminating any cases from
smaller cities and towns. We have also studied seasonality biases, nonresponse biases, and
statistical outliers. These technical problems are discussed in Ten Years Later, supra note 27,
at 147-54.
76. One direct comparison can be made. Three of the ten districts reported on in 1981 were
also reported on in the 1991 study. The three districts are the Northern District of Illinois
(Chicago), the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia), and the Western District of
Texas (San Antonio). The results of these comparisons are reported in Ten Years Later, supra
note 27. The findings reported there are consistent with the findings reported below,
suggesting-but certainly not establishing-that the differences observed are differences over
time rather than differences among districts. For more discussion of interdistrict variation, see
id. at 151-54.
77. Figure 3 is a graphic representation of the data presented in more detail in Table 3 in
the Appendix. Table 2 in the Appendix is reproduced to demonstrate the patterns when total
debt is compared with income.
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FIGURE 3
Median Nonmortgage Debt-to-Income Ratios for Ch. 7 Debtors
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The debt-to-income ratio of these debtors also is revealing. This is the basic
balance sheet for each debtor-how much debt and how much income does the
family have at the time it declares bankruptcy? The results are reported both for
all debt, and then again with the mortgage debt taken out of the calculation. In
both cases, the data are once again inconsistent with a hypothesis of increasing
debtor abuse. The debt-to-income ratio for debtors from 1981 to 1991 has
remained remarkably consistent. There is no statistically significant difference
in nearly two decades, even as the number of debtors has nearly quadrupled.
These data, although limited, are inconsistent with the hypothesis of increasing
debtor abuse as an explanation of the rise in consumer bankruptcies. Debtors in
1995 and 1997 had lower incomes than their counterparts in 1991, who had lower
incomes than their counterparts in 1981. The debtors' debt-to-income ratios have
not improved. To the extent the pool of debtors in bankruptcy is changing, the
data suggest that the pool of bankrupt debtors includes a growing number of low-
income debtors. The debt picture is more difficult to read, but total debt remains
statistically constant, although the composition of secured and unsecured debt
may be changing as more debtors have a larger fraction of unsecured debt when
they file for bankruptcy.
It would be too speculative to draw a firm conclusion from the limited data
points in these microdata studies, but the available income data are consistent
with reported changes in credit-granting policies. The growth in consumer credit
in recent years has been largest among the poorest Americans. The Federal
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Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finance notes that while debt burdens are
generally falling for families with incomes above $50,000, families with incomes
below $10,000 are increasing their debt loads.78 Banking industry analysts
attribute rising credit card defaults in part to the increase in credit solicitations
to lower-income Americans. "[T]he issuers, in our opinion, have chosen to
extend credit to individuals in a lower stratum of the creditworthiness spectrum
compared with prior cycles." '79 The fastest-growing credit issuers in the past five
years have been companies that specialize in loans to borrowers with poor credit
histories, the so-called subprime market."0 Although losses are substantial,
effective interest rates of 18 to 40%"' make this kind of lending profitable. Well-
known credit issuers have entered the subprime credit market. In 1996, Ford
Credit, for example, announced an "ambitious plan" to enter the subprime
lending market.8 2 Other mainstream lenders, including FDIC-insured banks, have
entered this market as well.83 As more creditors extend loans to lower-income
people and to people out of work and otherwise in credit trouble, it would not be
surprising if the bankruptcy pool expanded to include people with lower and
lower incomes. The microdata do not prove this point, but they are certainly
consistent with it.
The credit industry study collected information on incomes and debts in 1996.
Notwithstanding the criticism leveled at the study by the GAO84 and the CBO,"5
I would have included their data as another point in time in the comparison of
debtors over time. The problem is that the CRC study does not report enough
information to enable valid statistical comparisons with other data. The CRC
study includes reports on both income and debts, which are essential to all of its
calculations, but insufficient data, such as the number of valid responses in each
cell and the standard deviation of the response, to make any valid comparisons
with other data. Moreover, income and debt are disaggregated in ways that make
direct comparisons problematic.
Another study employing analysis of data directly from the bankruptcy files
comes from economics professor Ian Domowitz of Northwestern, along with
Robert Sartain of Abt Associates, who analyzed information about bankrupt
debtors from a sample drawn by the GAO in 1980 from cases filed in New York,
78. See Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Family Finances in the U.S.: Recent Evidence from the
Survey of Consumer Finance, 83 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1, 21 & tbl.14 (1997).
79. George M. Salem & Aaron C. Clark, Bank Credit Cards: Loan Loss Risks Are
Growing, BANKING INDUSTRY REP. (Gerard Klauer Mattison & Co., New York, N.Y.), June
11, 1996, at7.
80. See Dow Jones & Co., Shrinking Profits Drive Mortgage Banker into B&C Loans, CAP.
MARKETS REP., Oct. 7, 1997, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database (reporting an
increase from $80 billion in subprime loans in 1992 to $150 billion in 1996).
81. See Robyn Meredith, Will Ford Become the New Repo Man?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1996, § 3, at 1.
82. Id.
83. See Barbara A. Rehm, In a First, FDIC Warns Banks About Dangers of Subprime
Lending Series: 5, AM. BANKER, May 13, 1997, at 2.
84. See GAO REPORT, supra note 54, app. I, at 37-46.
85. See Kowalewski, supra note 23, at I.
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Ohio, Kentucky, and California.86 Domowitz and Sartain analyzed 827 cases,
supplementing the information with data from the Survey of Consumer Finance,
to see how bankrupt debtors differed from those in the population generally."7
Among their conclusions:
In terms of the decision to declare bankruptcy, health problems leading to
substantial medical debt are found to constitute the most important factor in
assessing the impact of household conditions. The impact of medical debt on
the population incidence of filings may not be large, however, in the sense
that a small percentage of the population has such debt in large amounts
relative to income.
The largest single contribution to bankruptcy at the margin is credit card
debt relative to income. An increase in credit card debt from the population
average to the level of a typical bankrupt household is predicted to cause a
six-fold increase in the conditional probability of filing for protection.8"
Professor Domowitz also conducted a time-series analysis for cases filed through
1995, and he has spent some time looking at ability to repay. He describes his
work as not a major study in itself, but instead as "confirmatory of evidence from
other researchers."89 He concludes that "Chapter 7 debtors able to repay
substantially constituted a very small fraction of the debtor sample."9
The macrodata reported earlier provide a general explanation for the increase
in consumer filings-the rise in filings accompanies the rise in consumer debt.
This explanation is reinforced by the microdata examining the files of individual
debtors. The available data does not support the leap from the rise in bankruptcy
filings to the conclusion that we are in the midst of a bankruptcy crisis.
III. THE CRISIS
Is there a bankruptcy crisis? In one sense, the answer is "no." The system is not
in crisis; the evidence points toward a consistent use over time of consumer
bankruptcy by the same kinds of families-families in serious financial trouble.
Despite the credit industry's repeated assertions, no credible evidence to the
contrary exists.
But in another sense, these data demonstrate an undeniable crisis. Every
personal bankruptcy filing represents a family crisis. Whether the stories are
about layoffs, medical problems, divorces, idiotic purchases, or failed
businesses, no one wants to tell a story that ends in failure and a petition for
86. See Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, Determinants of the Consumer Bankruptcy
Decision 1 (Jan. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Departihent of Economics at
Northwestern University).
87. See id. at 7. Professor Domowitz responded to criticisms from Dr. Staten about the
"age" of his data in a detailed letter to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. See
Domowitz, supra note 59. Professor Domowitz pointed out that his work, unlike Dr. Staten's,
covers a long time period that includes the "ebbs and flows of filings with the business cycle."
Id. at 2.
88. Domowitz & Sartain, supra note 86, at 2.
89. Domowitz, supra note 59, at 2.
90. Id.
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bankruptcy. Everyone wants to be a success in the American competition for
prosperity; bankruptcy singles out those who did not make it. The most important
event for more than 1.3 million families in 1997 was that they publicly declared
they were bankrupt-failures who could not stretch their paychecks from one
week to the next. The number of American families who have made this
declaration has nearly quadrupled in less than twenty years, and the growth in
filings shows no signs of abating.
We should be haunted by questions about why so many Americans are losers
in the great financial game of life. Dealing with the problems of more than a
million families is not as easy as closing the doors to the bankruptcy courts. To
understand these failures, inquiries must reach well beyond the bankruptcy
system. The coverage and stiffness of the social safety net, the implications of
lack of medical insurance, job layoffs and downsizing, growth in the availability
of subprime consumer debt at effective annual interest rates of thirty and forty
percent, and irresponsible purchasing should prompt both scholarly and political
inquiry. Better health insurance coverage, limits on credit solicitations, and better
consumer credit disclosures might help more families use credit wisely, which
would help them survive the financial pitfalls many will encounter. In any event,
lowering the bankruptcy filing rate should not be an end in itself, a decline in
rates is good only if it is a sign that fewer families are failing.
1998]
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
Distribution of Income and Debts for Chapter 7 Debtors
in 1981, 1991, 1995 and 1997, Adjusted to 1997 Dollarsa
1981 b
Total Secured Unsecured
Distribution Income Debt Debt Debt
Mean 25,961 69,017 36,209 32,805
s.d. 16,661 101,258 66,983 62,157
25th percentile 15,107 16,601 2,182 8,168
Median 23,254 35,434 13,596 14,666
75th percentile 35,314 75,984 45,904 29,134
Valid N 715 916 917 915
Missing 202 1 0 2
1991 C (Three Districts)
Total Secured Unsecured
Distribution Income Debt Debt Debt
Mean 21,444 57,384 26,992 30,094
s.d. 13,610 67,163 46,225 43,739
25th percentile 13,660 18,197 0 11,477
Median 18,807 30,336 6,906 19,550
75th percentile 27,089 73,442 32,977 31,991
Valid N 249 254 257 254
Missing 8 3 0 3
a. Cases with extreme values on assets, total debt, or income are removed. Outliers
removed are beyond the cut off points used in As WE FORGIVE, supra note 2, adjusted to 1997
dollars using the Consumer Price Index. To adjust for inflation, the original 1981 figures were
multiplied by 1.7656773. The original 1991 figures were multiplied by 1.1784141. The original
1995 figures were multiplied by 1.0531496. Adjusted cut-off points to determine outliers were
Income > 114,769; Assets > 882,838; Total Debt > 882,838.
b. See As WE FORGIVE, supra note 2; 1981 data reported in 1997 dollars.
c. Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Phase II; 1991 data reported in 1997 dollars.
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19 9 5 d
Total Secured Unsecured
Distribution Income Debt Debt Debt
Mean 19,943 73,981 36,757 37,224
s.d. 12,550 97,809 73,548 52,185
25th percentile 11,981 19,836 0 13,213
Median 17,958 40,369 7,364 23,021
75th percentile 25,528 90,255 44,253 39,791
Valid N 1,033 1,035 1,035 1,035
Missing 2 0 0 0
1997e
Total Secured Unsecured
Distribution Income Debt Debt Debt
Mean 17,765 51,994 19,895 30,230
s.d. 9,614 47,912 26,478 38,181
25th percentile 11,664 21,933 2,268 15,816
Median 17,652 37,455 9,217 19,915
75th percentile 23,496 62,091 28,050 32,025
Valid N 75 75 75 75
Missing 0 0 0 0
d. The Bankruptcy Reaffirmation Project; 1995 data reported in 1997 dollars.
e. Ohio Data (Judge Sellers); 1997 data reported in 1997 dollars.
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Statistical Tests (t-value)
Income
1997 vs. 1995
t-value 1.472
1997 vs. 1991 (3)
t-value **2.1822
1997 vs. 1981
t-value ***4.1863
1995 vs. 1991 (3)
t-value 1.664'
1995 vs. 1981
t-value ***8.605'
1991 (3) vs. 1981
t-value ***3.8533
'IANA LAW JOURNAL
Total Secured
Debt Debt
1.929' 1.9762
0.648' 1.269
1.442 **2.0952
***2.5603 **2.0312
1.100 0.171
1.728' **2.0722
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Unsecured
Debt
1.139
0.024
0.353
**2.0112
1.706'
0.652
Source: Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Phases I and II, The Bankruptcy
Reaffirmation Project, The Honorable Barbara Sellers.
1. Significant atp < .10 (t> 1.645).
2. Significant at p < .05 (t > 1.960).
3. Significant at p < .01 (t> 2.326).
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TABLE 2
Distribution of Total Debt/Income Ratio for Chapter 7 Debtorsa
Total
Debt/Income
RatioDistribution
Mean
s.d.
25th percentile
Median
75th percentile
Valid N
Zero Income
Missing
3.56
11.89
0.71
1.42
2.58
686
29
202
1991' (Three Districts)
Total
Debt/Income
RatioDistribution
Mean
s.d.
25th percentile
Median
75th percentile
Valid N
Zero Income
Missing
2.82
3.70
1.07
1.70
3.22
239
7
11
a. Cases with extreme values on assets, total debt, or income are removed. Outliers
removed are beyond the cut off points used in As WE FORGIVE, supra note 2, adjusted to 1997
dollars using the Consumer Price Index. Adjusted cut-off points to determine outliers were
Income> 114,769; Assets> 882,838; Total Debt> 882,838.
b. See As WE FORGIVE, supra note 2.
c. Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Phase II.
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Distribution
Mean
s.d.
25th percentile
Median
75th percentile
Valid N
Zero Income
Missing
Total
Debt/Income
Ratio
4.87
23.61
1.23
2.37
4.55
988
45
2
1997e
Distribution
Mean
s.d.
25th percentile
Median
75th percentile
Valid N
Zero Income
Missing
Total
Debt/Income
Ratio
2.61
2.03
1.13
2.32
3.08
69
6
0
d. The Bankruptcy Reaffirmation Project.
e. Ohio Data (Judge Sellers).
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Statistical Tests (t-tests)
1997 vs. 1995
t-value
1997 vs. 1991 (3)
t-value
1997 vs. 1981
t-value
1995 vs. 1991 (3)
t-value
1995 vs. 1981
t-value
1991 (3)vs. 1981
t-value
Total
Debt/Income
Ratio
0.794
0.452
0.662
1.337
1.340
0.945
Source: Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Phases I and II, The Bankruptcy
Reaffirmation Project, The Honorable Barbara Sellers.
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TABLE 3
Distribution of Total Nonmortgage Debt/Income Ratios
for Chapter 7 Debtorsa
1981 b
Total Nonmortgage
Debt/Income
RatioDistribution
Mean
s.d.
25th percentile
Median
75th percentile
Valid N
Zero Income
Missing
1991C (Three Districts)
2.30
7.52
0.57
0.87
1.69
685
29
203
Total Nonmortgage
Debt/Income
RatioDistribution
Mean
s.d.
25th percentile
Median
75th percentile
Valid N
Zero Income
Missing
1.93
2.50
0.82
1.25
1.93
174
7
76
a. Cases with extreme values on assets, total debt, or income are removed. Outliers
removed are beyond the cut off points used in As WE FORGIVE, supra note 2. Adjusted cut-off
points to determine outliers were Income > 114,769; Assets > 882,838; Total Debt > 882,838.
b. See As WE FORGIVE, supra note 2.
c. Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Phase II.
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Total Nonmortgage
Debt/Income
RatioDistribution
Mean
s.d.
25th percentile
Median
75th percentile
Valid N
Zero Income
Missing
3.61
23.31
0.98
1.55
2.76
988
45
2
1997e
Total Nonmortgage
Debt/Income
RatioDistribution
Mean
s.d.
25th percentile
Median
75th percentile
Valid N
Zero Income
Missing
1.92
1.29
1.05
1.64
2.61
69
6
0
d. The Bankruptcy Reaffirmation Project.
e. Ohio Data (Judge Sellers).
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Statistical Tests (t-tests)
1997 vs. 1995
t-value
1997 vs. 1991 (3)
t-value
1997 vs. 1981
t-value
1995 vs. 1991 (3)
t-value
1995 vs. 1981
t-value
1991 (3) vs. 1981
t-value
Source: Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Phases I and II, The Bankruptcy
Reaffirmation Project, The Honorable Barbara Sellers.
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Total Nonmortgage
Debt/Income
-Ratio
0.602
0.033
Q.419
0.949
1.420
0.639
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